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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT
The jurisdiction of all appellate courts shall be provided by statute

1

Section 78-2-

2(3)(j) of the Utah Code, provides that 'The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction

,

over orders judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of
Appeals does not have original appellate junsdiction[]"2 This is an appeal from the final
judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, and although it has original appellate
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has transferred this matter to the Court of Appeals
pursuant to § 78-2-2(4) and § 78-2a-3(2)(j), which provide that the Supreme Court may
transfer any matter over which it has original appellate jurisdiction
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1

Whether the Third District Court properly granted a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to

Dismiss Petitioner Neldon P Johnson s Complaint against Respondent Claudia Laycock?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Review of a grant of a motion to dismiss presents questions of law that the Court
of Appeals review for correctness, giving no deference to the decision of the [trial] court'"
Sullivan v Sullivan, 2004 UT App 485, fl 5, 105 P 3d 963 (alteration in original) (quoting
Foutzv City of S Jordan, 2004 UT 75, H 8, 100 P 3d 1171)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case

Ltah Const, Article VIII, § 5
Ut Code Ann , § 78-2 2(3)0) (1953, as amended)
1

I initiated this matter against Claudia Laycock seeking injunctive relief, not
monetary damages, for her various rulings and orders entered in my divorce
proceeding.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below:
I filed the Complaint against Claudia Laycock on March 1, 2006 in the Fourth
Judicial District Court of Utah, (hereinafter "Rec") p. 1-5.
The constable served Claudia Laycock on March 6, 2006. See Rec. p. 11.
Claudia Laycock filed a Motion to Dismiss through her attorney, Brent M.
Johnson, on March 17, 2006. See Rec. p. 12-18.
I filed an objection to the Motion to Dismiss on March 3 1 , 2006. See Rec. p.
19-27.
Claudia Laycock filed a Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss on April 7,
2006. See Rec. p. 28-31. A Notice to Submit for Decision was also submitted on
April 7, 2006. See Rec. p. 32.
On April 10,2006, the matter was re-assigned from the Fourth Judicial District
Court to the Third Judicial District Court because the Defendant was presently a
judge of the Fourth District Court. See R. p. 34-35.
On April 14, 2006, the matter was assigned to the Hon. Robert Hilder. See
Rec. p. 36.
On April 19, 2006, the matter was set for oral argument on May 5, 2006. See
Rec. p. 38.
2

Oral arguments were heard on May 5, 2006 wherein Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss was granted. See Rec. p. 4 1 .
The district court signed an Order on May 30, 2006 dismissing the complaint
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and stating that Claudia
Laycock is entitled to judicial immunity. See Rec. p. 42-44.
The Notice of Appeal was filed on June 28, 2006. See Rec. p. 45-46.
The Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to the Utah Court of Appeals.
See Rec. p. 47-49.
Facts established in the Record below:
1.

Neldon P. Johnson, Petitioner, is a party to the civil divorce action

known as Civil No. 004401468 currently pending in the Fourth Judicial District Court,
Utah County, State of Utah before the Honorable Judge Fred D. Howard. See
Complaint H 3, Rec. P. 1.
2.

During part of the lawsuit, Judge Claudia Laycock served as the Judge

assigned to the matter. See Complaint % 4, Rec. P. 1.
3.

During the time Judge Laycock was assigned to the lawsuit, Judge

Laycock acted outside the jurisdiction of the Court. See Complaint fl 5, Rec. P. 2.
4.

As a direct result of Judge LaycocWs actions acting outside the scope

of the jurisdiction of the Court, Neldon Johnson has been damaged and his real
property has been taken. See Complaint fl 6, Rec. P. 2.

3

5

During the lawsuit, Judge Laycock acted in a malicious and prejudicial

manner, e<ceeding the scope of the Court's jurisdiction

See Complaint fl 7, Rec

P 2
6

As a direct result of Judge Laycock's actions, Plaintiff has suffered

damages and his constitutional rights of due process have been violated

See

Complaint fi 8, Rec P 2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1

Petitioner Neldon P Johnson stated a claim for relief against Judge

Claudia Laycock by alleging that Judge Laycock acted outside the scope of the
Court's jurisdiction in the complaint

The notice pleading requirements do not

require that Mr Johnson plead all of the facts supporting the Complaint

The

decision ot the Third District Court to grant the Motion to Dismiss was incorrect and
should be reversed
2

Because the Complaint does not seek any monetary damages against

Judge Laycock, but only injunctive relief, judicial immunity does not apply in this
proceeding
3

If the Complaint lacked sufficient facts under the notice pleading

requirements, the Court should have given Petitioner the opportunity to submit an
amended complaint with a more definite statement of the facts

An opportunity to

submit a complaint with a more definite statement of the facts is more appropriate
than dismissing the case
4

ARGUMENT
L

The Complaint Contained Sufficient Facts to Grant Injunctive
Relief.

Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 8, pleadings should contain
a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief

All that is required is that the pleadings be sufficient to give fair notice of the

nature and basis of the claim asserted and a general indication of the type of
litigation involved. Guardian Title Co. v. Mitchell, 54 P.3d 130 (Utah 2002). Under
the liberal standard of notice pleading, a plaintiff is required "to submit a 'short and
plain statement

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and xa demand for

judgment for the relief."' Canfield v Lavton City, 2005 UT 60, fl 14, 122 P.3d 622
(omission in original) (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)-(2)). "The plaintiff must only
give the defendant fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a
general indication of the type of litigation involved." jd. Judge Claudia Laycock has
received fair notice of the nature and basis of the claims I have asserted against her
and the type of litigation involved in this matter.
The fundamental purpose of the rules of civil procedure is to "hberaliz[e] both
pleading and procedure to the end that the parties are afforded the privilege of
presenting whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their dispute "
Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (Utah 1963) In Cheney, the Utah Supreme
Court held that the failure of the defendants to plead a subsequent agreement as an

5

affirmative defense was not fatal to the trial court's consideration of that agreement.
See id. In rejecting the plaintiffs argument to the contrary, the court explained: What
[a party is] entitled to is notice of the issues raised and an opportunity to meet them.
When this is accomplished, that is all that is required. Our rules provide for liberality
to allow examination into and settlement of all issues bearing upon the controversy,
but safeguard the rights of the other party to have a reasonable time to meet a new
issue if he so requests. Rule 15(b) [of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure] so states.
Cheney, 381 P.2d at 91 (footnote omitted); see also Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v.
Harrison, 70 P.3d 35 (2003) (holding that the failure to plead fraud with particularity
was not fatal where the defendant had notice and an opportunity to respond);
Motivated Mqmt. Inf I v. Finney, 604 P.2d 467, 468 (Utah 1979) (holding, under rule
54(c)(1), that the plaintiffs complaint was not defective, even though it sought to
foreclose a lien that on appeal the plaintiff conceded was invalid, because the
complaint also sought a judgment for money damages against the defendants); PLC
Landscape Constr. v. Piccadilly Fish *N Chips, lnc.502 P.2d 562, 563 (Utah 1972)
(holding that the trial court properly allowed recovery on the basis of quantum meruit,
even though the complaint sought relief on the basis of an express contract,
because the defendant was not "denied a fair opportunity to meet the change in
theory of recovery"); Buehner Block Co. v. Glezos, 310 P.2d 517, 519-20 (Utah
1957) (holding that the trial court properly considered the issue of partnership,
although it was not formally raised by the pleadings, because both parties presented
6

evidence on the issue at trial); Shinkoskev v. Shinkoskey, 19 P.3d 1005 (Ut. App.
2001) (holding that the trial court properly ordered the appellant to repay funds
misappropriated from his children's custodial accounts, even though that issue was
not raised in the pleadings, because he "had the opportunity to prepare and meet
the issue1'); Consolidated Realty Group v. Sizzling Platter, Inc.. 930 P.2d 268,275-76
(Utah Ct. App. 1996) (rejecting argument that the trial court impermissibly granted
relief on a theory not pleaded where the defendant had notice and an opportunity to
respond); Henderson v. For-Shor Co., 757 P.2d 465, 472 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)
(holding that trial court properly considered an overcharge claim, despite the fact that
it was not formally raised in the pleadings, because the appellant failed to show it
was prejudiced by consideration of the claim). Rule 54(c)(1) requires trial courts to
be liberal in awarding appropriate relief justified by the facts developed at trial, as
long as the failure to request a particular form of relief does not prejudice a party in
the preparation or trial of the case. If there is no prejudice, it is necessary only that
the relief granted be supported by the evidence and be a permissible form of relief
for the claims litigated. Henderson, 757 P.2d at 472 (quotations and citations
omitted).
In the complaint I filed against Claudia Laycock, I alleged that Judge Laycock
acted outside the jurisdiction of the Court. Assuming this allegation is correct, which
the Court must accept as true, the motion to dismiss should be denied I should be
given the oppportunity, through the discovery process, to present and obtain
7

evidence that supports the allegations that Judge Laycock acted outside the scope
of her judicial duties. I need to obtain discovery from Judge Laycock on her rotation
off of the case and what she said to the new Judge that was rotated onto the case
It is not within the juridiction of the Court to act as an advocate for or against one of
the parties before the tribunal, nor is it within the judicial authority of the Court to
malign or discredit one of the parties to the new judge that has rotated onto the case

Surely the definition of non-judicial function is broader than that used by the
district court. Judge Robert K. Hilder stated that a non-judicial function wouid be for
him to come down off the bench and smack me in the mouth

See May 5, 2006

Hearing Transcript, Rec. P. 54, lines 20-23 pg. 31. While this certainly would qualify
as a non-judicial function, perhaps worse than being hit in the mouth is to have a
judge unilaterally, without the request of either party, change a stipulated divorce
agreement and impose non-statutory requirements that were not part of the
stipulated agreement. To cloak this action with "judicial function" and therefore
immunize the judge for her advocacy is to misapply the doctrine of judicial immunity
I would rather take the punch in the mouth from the Judge than have the Judge
unilaterally re-write our stipulated divorce decree and take my real property without
due process All I want is a chance to either amend the complaint or go through the
discovery process to prove the case that I have alleged. Judicial immunity certainly
doesn't apply to every action taken from the bench
8

Discovery in the case will show that Judge Laycock acted outside the
jurisdiction of the Court by drafting a trust deed and trust deed note and requiring
that I sign the documents drafted by the Court. This is not a judicial act. A judge
does not have the authority to draft documents and require that parties before the
Court sign the document drafted by the Judge.

Although judges are granted

immunity from liability for damages for acts performed in their judicial capacities and
committed within their judicial jurisdiction, drafting agreements in a case pending
before the judge is not a judicial act and not within the jurisdiction of the Court.
Sanders v. Leavitt, 37 P.3d 1052, 1056 (Utah 2001).

Nor does my complaint

against Judge Laycock seek monetary damages. The only relief requested in my
complaint against Judge Laycock is a declaratory judgment and restraining order.
In my divorce case, the parties agreed upon a trust deed and trust deed note.
The trust deed was recorded. The Court, acting as legal counsel, decided to change
the trust deed and modify the negotiations of the parties who were both represented
by counsel. In addition to drafting the newly created trust deed and trust deed note,
the Court has now imposed upon me not only the form of the trust deed and trust
deed note but has required that I sign it in ten days. I never agreed to the trust deed
and trust deed note as drafted by Judge Laycock. My attorney objected to the
documents during the hearing before Judge Laycock. The Court does not have the
authority to fill in contract terms that were not included in the divorce decree.

If

there is "any uncertainty or indefiniteness, or future negotiations or considerations

9

to be had between the parties, there is not a completed contract. In fact, there is no
contract at all." Candland v. Oldrovd, 248 P. 1101,1102 (Utah 1926). The amended
decree of divorce does not set forth the terms and conditions of the trust deed and
trust deed note. Because the terms and conditions of this critical part of the decree
are left for future negotiations, there is not a completed contract and the matter must
be set aside. "It is fundamental that a meeting of the minds on the integral features
of an agree ment is essential to the formation of a contract. An agreement cannot be
enforced if its terms are indefinite." Richard Barton Enters, v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368,
373 (Utah 1996) (citing Pinqree v. Conf I Group of Utah, inc.,558 P.2d 1317, 1321
(Utah 1976)); Valcarce v. Bitters, 362 P.2d 427, 428 (1961)) (additional citations
omitted); see also Candland v. Oldrovd, 248 P. 1101,1102 (1926) ("So long as there
is any uncertainty or indefiniteness, or future negotiations or considerations to be
had between the parties, there is not a completed contract. In fact, there is no
contract at all."). The court must be able to enforce the contract according to the
parties' intentions; if those intentions are impenetrable, or never actually existed,
there can be no contract to enforce.

The Court does not have the authority to

unilaterally impose the requirements of a judicially created document and require
that I sign it.
"A contract may be enforced even though some contract terms may be
missing or left to be agreed upon, but if the essential terms aire so uncertain that
there is no basis for deciding whether the agreement has been kept or broken, there

10

is no contract." Acad. Chicago Publishers v. Cheever. 578 N.E.2d 981, 984 (III.
1991) (citations omitted). "Whether or not the [missing term] was essential to the
contract requires an examination of the entire agreement and the circumstances
under which the agreement was entered into." Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Meyer, 575
P.2d 1048, 1050 (Utah 1978). Merely satisfying the minimum requirements for the
statute of frauds does not automatically render all contracts sufficiently definite to be
enforced by the courts. The terms and conditions of the trust deed and trust deed
note are essential terms to the decree of divorce. Because the parties failed to
negotiate the terms and conditions of the trust deed and trust deed note, the decree
must be set aside. Instead of setting the divorce decree aside, Judge Laycock
drafted the trust deed and trust deed note.
An unenforceable agreement to agree occurs when parties to a contract fail
to agree on material terms of the contract "with sufficient definiteness to be
enforced" Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah 1988) (quoting
Valcarce v. Bitters, 362 P.2d 427, 428 (Utah 1961)). The present action provides
an example of what happens when material terms are omitted from an agreement
and then one of the parties attempts to enforce the agreement. In this case, my exspouse has attempted to enforce the agreement via contempt proceedings, when
her exclusive remedy under Utah's one-action rule is to proceed against the security
of the trust deed and trust deed note in the U-check real and personal property. The
terms and conditions of the trust deed and trust deed note have not been finalized,
11

negotiated or completed by the parties, therefore the amended decree is impossible
to enforce and should be set aside.
"[P]arties to a contract may, by mutual consent, modify any or all of a
contract." Pasker. Gould, Ames & Weaver, Inc. v. Morse, 887 P.2d 872, 877 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994) (quotations and citation omitted). "A valid modification of a contract
. . . requires xa meeting of the minds of the parties, which must be spelled out, either
expressly or impliedly, with sufficient definiteness.'" Richard Barton Enters., Inc. v.
Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 373 (Utah 1996) (quoting Valcarce v. Bitters, 362 P.2d 427,
428 (1961)); see Scott v. Majors, 980 P.2d 214 (Ut. Ct. App. 1999)(noting that to
"alter, or supplant a contract fairly made," "[t]he same meeting of the minds is
needed that was necessary to make the contract in the first place" (quotations,
emphasis, and citation omitted)). ""[Contractual mutual assent requires assent by
all parties to the same thing in the same sense so that their minds meet as to all the
terms." Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Meyer, 575 P.2d 1048, 1050 (Ulah 1978); see also
Sackler v. Savin, 897 P.2d 1217, 1220-22 (Utah 1995) (holding that to form an
enforceable contract, there must be a meeting of the minds on the essential terms
of the agreement).
In my divorce action before Judge Laycock, Commissioner Patton and Judge
Laycock unilaterally ordered my ex-spouse to draft the terms and conditions of the
trust deed and trust deed note and then Judge Laycock ordered me to sign the
documents

The unilateral modification of the divorce decree is a contract
12

modification without mutual consent and therefore invalid. It is axiomatic that both
parties to the agreement must consent to and agree upon the terms and conditions
of the trust deed and trust deed note. The Court does not have the ability to force
one party to agree to a modification to a stipulated decree of divorce.
II.

Judicial Immunity Applies to Monetary Damages, Not Injunctive
Relief

The Complaint filed against Judge Laycock does not seek monetary damages,
but only injunctive relief. Judicial Immunity applies to protect those acting within the
scope of the jurisdiction of the Court. As stated above, Judge Laycock was not
acting within the scope of the jurisdiction of the Court. The Court has no authority
to draft agreements between parties or enter orders that modify the agreement of the
parties without express statutory authorization. For example, while it may be true
that a Court has the authority to not accept a stipulated divorce decree that does not
provide for child support, that was not the case before Judge Laycock. The parties
had agreed to use a non-recourse trust deed as collateral for monetary payments
to be paid as party of the property settlement. The Court refused to accept the
agreement of the parties and unilaterally modified the trust deed. I do not seek
monetary damages for Judge Laycock's misuse of her judicial authority, but only
request that the Court prevent the use and application of Judge Laycock's decision
to go outside the bounds of her jurisdiction.
III. Amended Complaint More Appropriate than Dismissing the Action
13

Finally, if the district court didn't think there were sufficient facts to support my
allegation that Judge Laycock acted outside the jurisdiction of the court, then why
didn't the district court request a more definite statement of facts. Utah is a pleading
state and therefore only the bare minimum facts are necessary to put the defendant
on notice regarding a lawsuit. I met those requirements. Judge Hilder decided that
nothing I know about or can discover would constitute acting outside the scope of
the Court's jurisdiction. What if Judge Laycock drafted the trust deed after a private
consultation with the opposing attorney in the case? What if Judge Laycock drafted
the trust deed to gain some personal favor? What if Judge Laycock used the Court
proceeding to punish me because of my race, sex or nationality? Granting the
motion to dismiss prevents me from the right I have to bring forth facts, and discover
additional facts, to prove my case. The blanket assertion that any act by a Judge
sitting on the bench is immune from scrutiny promotes judicial impropriety and left
unchecked, could result in widespread mistrust of the judiciary and the judicial
process.
CONCLUSION
Pursuant to the foregoing arguments and law, Petitioner respectfully requests
this Court overrule the District Court's decision to dismiss the complaint.
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DATED this

/ f

day of October, 2006.
PETITIONER

Neldon P. Johnston, Pro Se

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served two true and correct copies of the foregoing
PETITIONER'S OPENING BRIEF ON APPEAL, via first class mail, postage
prepaid, on the following:

Brent M. Johnson
Administrative Office of the Courts
P.O. Box 14021
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0241

on this

ffi

day of October, 2006.

Neldon P. J

Appendix
1. Complaint

Neldon P. Johnson. Pro Se
326 North State Road lc>8
Salem. Utah 84653

IN AND FOR THE- FOURTH DISTRICT COURT. PROVO DISTRICT
STATE OF UTAH

Neldon P. Johnson;
Plaintiff.

Claudia Laycock.
Defendant.

COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
Civil No. {j{/?0AC£)l£>h^

Judge £f&ft

COMES NOW Neldon P. Johnson, appearing pro se, and hereby complains of Defendant as
r.„ ] ! „ . . . . , .
lOIIOVVb.

PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE
1.

Plaintiff is an individual residing in Utah County.

2.

Defendant is an individual residing in Utah County.

3.

Plaintiff is a party to the civil divorce action known as Civil No. 004401468 currently
pending in the Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County, State of Utah before the
Honorable Judge Fred D. Howard ("the Lawsuit").

4.

During part of the Lawsuit. Judge Claudia Laycock served as the Judge assigned to the
matter.

5.

During the time that Judge haycock was assigned to the Lawsuit. Judge Laycock acted
outside thejurisdiction of the Court.

6.

As a direct result of Judge haycock's actions of acting outside the scope of the jurisdiction
of the Court. Plaintiff has been damaged and his real property has been taken.

7.

During the Lawsuit. Judge Laycock acted in a malicious and prejudicial manner, exceeding
the scope of the Court's jurisdiction.

8.

As a direct result of Judge Layeock's actions, Plaintiff has suffered damages and his
constitutional rights of due process have been violated.

9.

All parties hereto are domiciled in Utah County and the injury alleged herein was caused in
Utah County, State of Utah.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(DECLARATORY JUDGMENT THAT CLAUDIA LAYCOCK VIOLATED THE DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS OF NELDON P. JOHNSON)
10.

Plaintiff hereby refers to and incorporate each and every allegation set forth in paragraphs
one through 9 of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.

11.

Article 1. Section 7 of the Utah Constitution states that *wNo person shall be deprived of lite,
liberty or property, without due process of law." Utah Const, art. 1, § 7.

12.

As a direct result of Judge Laycock's unconstitutional acts. Plaintiff has been deprived of
property without due process.

13.

During the proceedings in the Lawsuit. Claudia Laycock acted in such a malicious and
prejudicial manner and outside the scope of thejurisdiction of the Court that she violated the
due process rights of Ncldon P. Johnson.

14.

Therefore. Plaintiff seeks declaratory judgment that the actions of Claudia Laycock during
the Lawsuit were outside the scope of the Court's jurisdiction and that such actions violated
the due process rights of Neldon P. Johnson.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(INJUNCTIVE RELIEF)

15.

Plaintiff hereby refers to and incorporates each and even allegation set forth in paragraphs
one through 12 of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.

16.

Plaintiff has incurred substantial damages and the loss of property without his
constitutionally protected rights of due process and seeks immediate injunctive relief from
this Court pending the outcome of these proceedings.

17.

Specifically, Plaintiff seeks to have all decisions, orders, and rulings made by Judge Claudia
Laycock in Civil No. 004401468 suspended until the outcome of this proceeding is fully and
finally determined by competent judges acting in accordance with the Constitution of the
State of Utah.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Wherefore Johnson prays for the following relief:
1.

For an opportunity to present evidence and testimony before an impartial judge concerning
the status of Mr. Johnson's real property.

2.

The right to have a fair hearing regarding Mr. Johnson's real property improperly deeded to
his ex-spouse.

3.

A determination that Claudia Laycock has violated Neldon Johnson's constitutional rights
of due process and therefore all decisions, orders, opinions or rulings of Claudia Laycock

should be stricken and the matters heard by an impartial judge pursuant to a fair hearing that
comports with the pnnciples of due process as guaranteed in the Utah Constitution.
4

And other amounts that the court may deem just.

DATED this

/

day of March, 2006.

Neldon P. /phnson, Pro Se

Plaintiffs Address:
326 North State Road 198
Salem, Utah 84653

